The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) in March 1985 provides a laboratory for examining the financial market's belief in the incentive-conflict model proposed by Kane (1989). Research in this area has yet to examine the stock returns of federally insured institutions during that period in the context of this model. Thus, it has not addressed the question of whether financial-market participants recosnize the implications of the model; that is, whether they anticipate the bailouts it implies. This paper fills that void.
I. Introduction
The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) In addition, although the ODGF crisis occurred in 1985, this study is more than simply an historical analysis. That crisis provides a laboratory for examining the financial market's belief in Kane's (1989) contention that self-interested management and politicians have powerful incentives to make uninsured depositors whole. Kane and Kaufman (1992) report that the incentive-conflict model explains events surrounding a similar crisis in Australia, but they do not examine the stock returns of affected institutions. Thus, they do not address the separate question of whether financial-market participants recognized the model's implications; that is, whether they anticipated the bailouts implied by the model. This paper fills that void.
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Kane and Unal (1990) and Thomson (1987a Thomson ( , 1987b show that investors incorporate the value of deposit guarantees in the market value of the firm's equity. If investors believed that the effects of the ODGF crisis were confined to members of the ODGF, or that both the FDIC and the FSLIC could easily weather the storm (perhaps by drawing on implicit government guarantees), then the stocks of federally guaranteed institutions would show no effect. If, in contrast, they believed that the crisis signaled a weakness in the federal government's resolve to honor those guarantees, then the stock returns of insured institutions should reflect that assessment, and firms insured by the decapitalized FSLIC should suffer more than their FDIC-insured counterparts. Larger declines by FSLIC-insured institutions could also result from a belief that the influx of ODGF thrifts to FSLIC would reduce confidence in federal guarantees or lead to higher insurance premiums.
Finally, if investors viewed the ODGF crisis as reaffirming the incentive-conflict model, thereby signaling continued regulatory forbearance and a strengthening of implicit guarantees, the stock returns of FSLIC firms could exceed those of their FDIC counterparts. This is because reaffirming FDIC guarantees would have been relatively unimportant compared to reaffirming FSLIC guarantees. Better-capitalized depository institutions would also lose from continued forbearance, because insolvent institutions would continue to compete away lending margins. To the extent that FDICinsured banks were better capitalized than FSLIC-insured firms, the former's stocks would have a less positive reaction to the government's handling of the ODGF. This interpretation implies that investors do not view the events predicted by the incentive-conflict model as a certainty. That is, they might well believe that government bailouts of depositors are likely and that capital forbearance will probably continue, but that neither outcome is inevitable.
Our results show that the ODGF crisis produced much information important to financial markets, and that it did indeed have different impacts, depending on the insurer. On average, FSLIC firms did reasonably well during a 41-day event window centered on the ODGFrs Bank Holiday, while FDIC firms did not. Stockholders of FDIC-insured firms began to absorb losses 19 days prior to the Bank Holiday. They also lost rather heavily during a two-day event period consisting of the Bank Holiday and the day before, and during the days shortly after. By comparison, though, FSLICinsured thrifts lost early in the 41-day event window, began to recover about seven days before the Bank Holiday, and on average gained more than 2.1% during the event window. More important, differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms were consistent with a reaffirmation of the incentive-conflict model. When government authorities moved towards a bailout of the ODGF, stock returns on FSLIC-insured institutions exceeded those of FDIC-insured institutions. When authorities sold off entry privileges to out-of-state banks, the relationship was reversed. This paper is organized as follows: The next section states our hypotheses and describes our method and data. Section I11 reports the results. Section IV summarizes our findings.
Hypotheses, Bkthod, and Data
We test the following groups of hypotheses, each group predicting different stock-return behavior for institutions insured by the FSLIC and the FDIC:
1. Financial-market participants viewed the guarantees of the FSLIC and FDIC as a) comparable, or b) at least sufficient to weather the information released during the ODGF crisis.
2. Financial-market participants a) considered the credibility of FSLIC guarantees to be weakened by the crisis, or b) feared an influx of weak ODGF thrifts to the FSLIC that might lead to higher insurance premiums.
3. Financial-market participants viewed the ODGF crisis as a) increasing the likelihood of a federal bailout of the FSLIC fund, or b) reaffirming regulatory forbearance, in accordance with the incentive-conflict model. Brown and Warner (1980) report that a value-weighted index is more prone to problems than the equal-weighted index we use, and that using the equalweighted index led to no major difficulties. To check our results, we replicated portions of our study using a value-weighted index with no important differences. In their later paper (19851, Brown and Warner report that even extreme event clustering has relatively little impact, although with similar industry groups some methods tend to reject the null of no abnormal performance too often. Using the two-index model in this paper helps to minimize this potential problem, and Brown and Warner (1985) report that using more complex approaches could result in potentially large losses in power. Most important, corrections for event clustering adjust the standard error of the abnormal returns, not the abnormal return itself. Given that our paper's main focus is the differences between FDIC and FSLIC institutions, event clustering is not likely to be a problem. c = a mean-zero, serially uncorrelated error. j t We calculate announcement-period prediction errors (PE ) using the j t estimated coefficients a pj, and y in equation (I):
We calculate standardized prediction errors (SPEs) by dividing each abnormal return in equation (2) by an estimate of its standard error: If the Ohio Bank Holiday had no effect on the stock returns of the financial institutions in our sample, these SPEs are not statistically different from zero. If investors perceived this event to be favorable (unfavorable) to these institutions, then the SPEs are significantly positive (negative). To form multiday Z-statistics, we sum the standardized daily returns for each firm across the observation period, average them across firms, and divide by the sample standard deviation, 1/ ( d~) , where N is the number of firms.
A variation of the Mikkelson and Partch approach ([19861, hereafter MP) has been developed by Boehmer, Musumeci and Paulsen ([19911, hereafter BMP) , who call their variation the standardized-cross-section method and provide evidence that it is robust to a variety of statistical problems, including event clustering. Because all firms in our sample experience the same event date, we also use the BMP method. However, this method does not generalize to multiday return intervals, and BMP report that the MP approach also works well. Consistent with this, we find that results from the BMP approach and the MP method do not differ substantially for one-day event windows. More important for our purposes, prediction errors from equation (2) 2. We exclude firms with more than 40 missing returns during the estimation period, those with more than 10 consecutive missing returns, and those with a missing return on either the event date or the day before. We treat the MSSIC thrift as an FSLIC institution because excluding it leads to similar results.
R e s u l t s
The appendix presents an abbreviated list of important political events during the 41-day event window surrounding March 15, 1985 for the two-day event window encompassing day -1 and day 0, two six-day windows (from day -5 to day 0 and from day 1 to day 6), and two eleven-day windows (from day -10 to day 0 and from day 1 to day 11). In all cases, we also report Z-statistics testing the hypothesis that these returns do not differ statistically from zero. The longer observation windows are particularly valuable in studies of financial crises such as that involving the ODGF, which spanned several days. Table 1 shows that a great deal of information reached the financial markets around this time. The MP Z-statistic is significant 12 of 41 times.4 The binomial Z-statistic is significant six times. Figure 1 graphs the daily AAR and CAR for Table 1 . There is no obvious trend in daily AARs, though the preponderance of negative values leads to a downward trend in the CAR beginning on day -19 and extending through day 10 before 3. This does not extend to binomial tests of two-day abnormal returns, because there is more than one way to pair the days, and the results could differ depending on the choice of pairs. Therefore, the proportion of positive two-day abnormal returns is tested against 0.5.
4 . Readers will note that the abnormal return and the MP Z-statistic sometimes have opposite signs, which is possible using this approach. Also, some care is needed when interpreting the event-study results because of potential problems with event clustering. Average percent prediction error for day 1 through day 11 = -0.339 Z-Statistic for day 1 through day 11 = -1.482
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
Event Day: Day relative to the event date.
Daily AAR: Average abnormal return for the day.
Z-Stat: Z-statistic testing the hypothesis that the Daily AAR is zero.
% Pos: Percent of abnormal returns greater than zero on the day.
Binomial Z-Stat: Binomial statistic testing the hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal returns on the day is greater than the proportion during the estimation period.
CAR:
Cumulative abnormal return.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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